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I.   INTRODUCTION
When Casey Martin hobbled1 into an Oregon federal district court
in January of 1998, Americans took notice. Martin, a young golfer
who competes on the Nike Tour, a lower level golf circuit run by the
Professional Golfers’ Association Tour (PGA Tour), possesses a rare
circulatory disorder that makes it painful and potentially dangerous
for him to walk.2 Martin sued the PGA Tour over its unwillingness to
allow him to use a golf cart in its competitions.3
Martin asserted a right to reasonable accommodation for his dis-
ability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).4 The PGA
                                                                                                                      
* This Note is dedicated to my son Alex who continues to teach me the trait of pa-
tience. I would like to thank Mr. John Bischof for enlightening me about golf, a sport I
knew nothing about prior to embarking on this project.
1. This reference is not meant to be derogatory, but rather to describe accurately Mr.
Martin’s gait, which observers characterize as closer to a hobble than a limp.
2. Martin has a circulatory ailment called Klippel-Trenauney syndrome. His right
leg is approximately half the girth of his left and has no primary vein. See Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (D. Or. 1998); see also Lisa Schnirring, Casey Martin’s
Case: The Medical Story, PHYSICIAN & SPORTS MEDICINE, Apr. 1998, at 15. Martin will
probably not be able to play golf past the age of 30. Further, his doctors say if his leg weak-
ens to the point it breaks, it will probably have to be amputated.
3. See generally Martin v. PGA, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998) (denying the
PGA Tour’s summary judgment motion); Martin v. PGA, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or.
1998) (holding that a disabled golfer’s request to use a cart during professional golf tour-
naments was reasonable and would not fundamentally alter the nature of the tourna-
ment).
4. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b)(2)(A) (1994).
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Tour argued that providing carts for players, even those with perma-
nent physical disabilities, would fundamentally alter the nature of
the sport and provide an unfair advantage to Martin because walk-
ing players and riding players experience different levels of fatigue.5
The case sparked an intense debate not only in country clubs and
sports bars, but also in the worldwide media, legal circles, and even
in the United States Congress.
Many viewed Martin as a courageous young golfer who overcame
adversity to achieve athletic recognition. Senators Bob Dole of Kan-
sas and Tom Harkin of Iowa spoke on behalf of Martin. Dole stated
he did not think that “PGA” should be an abbreviation for “Please Go
Away.”6 One newspaper columnist referred to Martin as “noble,” and
spoke of the PGA Tour as having “beliefs and attitudes as rigid as
rigor mortis,” as well as possessing a “heartlessness that is unparal-
leled in sports.”7 Another critic stated that “the [T]our should be put-
ting [Martin] on posters, not in court papers.”8 The lawsuit was re-
ferred to as “the PGA Tour’s saddest hour.”9
Golf’s greats, including Arnold Palmer and Jack Nicklaus, testi-
fied against Martin. Nicklaus stated that carts look bad on televi-
sion.10 When Palmer testified that walking is an essential physical
component of the game, journalists pointed out that Palmer “chain-
smoked his way to tournament victories in the 1960s”11 and queried
whether golfers “tote refrigerators on their backs,” ridiculing the
PGA Tour’s assertion that golf is an athletic sport.12 Another colum-
nist noted Nicklaus’s hypocrisy in proclaiming the sanctity of the
PGA Tour’s rules while requesting a different (nondisability) exemp-
tion for himself.13 The PGA Tour drew further fire from journalists by
                                                                                                                      
5. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
6. Thomas Bonk, Casey Case: Tour Has Cartload of Trouble, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1998, at C11.
7. Steve Kelley, Hypocritical Comments by Golf’s Greats Reveal Emptiness of PGA
Tour’s Case, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at D1.
8. Editorial, A Good Walk Spoiled; The PGA Doesn’t Get It, GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD, Feb. 1, 1998, at F2.
9. Kelley, supra note 7, at D1.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. Dave Kindred, Sprewell or Martin: It’s Time for a Hero, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Feb. 8, 1998, at E2.
13. See Tim Sullivan, Nicklaus Should Take Fair Way In, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Mar. 18, 1998, at D1. Sullivan noted that Nicklaus received a three-year special exemption
in March 1998 from the United States Golf Association (USGA), allowing him to play in
the U.S. Open, after Nicklaus supported the no-cart policy at Casey Martin’s trial. The
timing, at best, is curious. Sullivan also discussed the problem with the Tour’s seemingly
contradictory stance by stating that “[i]f you don’t treat everyone equally, you can’t pretend
you do.” Id. Sullivan further noted that Nicklaus’s exemption denied another player the
chance to compete: “Because the field is limited to 156 players, each special exemption de-
prives some other player an opportunity to qualify.” Id. Nicklaus’s original request for an
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comparing Martin’s disability to an ingrown toenail that one of Mar-
tin’s challengers suffered at the Nike season opener.14
Opposition to the Martin suit was also pervasive and passionate.
A Midwestern paper’s unscientific poll pegged support for Martin at
a mere ten percent of its readership.15 Columnists stressed the im-
portance of protecting the PGA Tour’s autonomy in regulating its
competitions, fearing a decision for Martin could “open a Pandora’s
box with far-reaching effects.”16 Some viewed the PGA Tour as the
real victim; big brother again undermined a private organization’s
ability to set its own rules.17 Others noted the importance of walking
in golf: “If you remove walking from golf, you change golf from a
sport to a game. You make it the equivalent of billiards, or bowling or
tiddlywinks almost.”18 One journalist simply stated, “[I]nfirmities
block a lot of us from taking part in the games we love.”19 Another re-
ferred to professional sports as “the ultimate Darwinian test of the
survival of the fittest” and asserted that “the disabled are not the
most fit.”20
Some criticism went beyond the Martin case. One economist
stated: “[Martin’s case is] based on a rotten law. The ADA [is] merely
a ‘feel-good law.’”21 To support this proposition, another ADA critic
pointed to a case in which a city was ordered to pay $1.5 million in
back insurance claims for artificial insemination and other treatment
because a police officer’s infertility was found to be a disability.22 The
                                                                                                                      
exemption was denied in January 1998, before the Martin trial. See Nicklaus Receives
Open Exemption, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 17, 1998, at D1.
Interestingly, Nicklaus has received five U.S. Open exemptions during his career. See
Ron Sirak, Nicklaus, Open Go Hand-in-Hand, Like Golf, Tradition, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb.
13, 1998, at 13. The exemption allows a player who does not qualify under the regular
rules to compete. Exemptions are used for publicity purposes, “to keep in the public’s eye
the living history of the game.” Id. Opponents argue that the limited number of spaces in
the competition should be given to those who have a realistic chance of winning. See id.
14. See Donald Kaul, If Golfers Are Athletes, So Are People Walking Dogs, ORLANDO
SENT., Feb. 17, 1998, at A11.
15. See Jeffery Flanagan, Readers Favor PGA Over Martin, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb.
8, 1998, at C2.
16. Joe Gordon, Golf Notes: Authority an Issue-Martin Case Weakens PGA, BOSTON
HERALD, Feb. 8, 1998, at B29.
17. See Robyn Blumner, Disabled Golfer Swings Wrong Club, DENVER ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 30, 1998, at A52.
18. Nightline: Casey Martin’s Triumph, Golfer Produces a Bold Stroke for the Dis-
abled (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 12, 1998) (statement of Mike Stachura, Reporter,
GOLF DIGEST), available in 1998 WL 5372982 [hereinafter Nightline].
19. Jim Murray, Golf’s for Athletes—Sorry, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at C1.
20. Blumner, supra note 17, at A52.
21. Alexandria Berger, Acceptance of Disableds’ Rights Has Come Slowly, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 22, 1998, at E10 (quoting James J. Keating, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, Jan. 15, 1998, at A30).
22. See Linda Chavez, The ADA: A Law Gone Haywire, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1998, at
17 (referring to Bielicki v. City of Chicago, No. 97-C-1471, 1997 WL 260595, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
May 8, 1997)).
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critic also focused on a pre-ADA case in which Northwest Airlines
contested the reinstatement of a pilot who was terminated for flying
while intoxicated after he successfully completed an alcohol rehabili-
tation program.23 Another ADA opponent proclaimed that the ADA is
a “haven for everyone from scam artists to disgruntled workers.”24
Still another spoke of the ADA as “terroriz[ing] institutions with its
rigid and uncompromising interpretation.”25
Criticism aside, Federal Magistrate Judge Thomas Coffin ruled in
Martin’s favor.26 Legal practitioners are left with a precedential case:
the Martin decision is the first time that a plaintiff has successfully
sued under the ADA for a modification of a professional sport organi-
zation’s playing rules.27 Further, the Martin trial marks the first
time a federal court has determined that the ADA even applies to
professional sports. Although the PGA Tour publicly promised Mar-
tin two years without “legal interference,”28 it has already filed an
appeal in the Ninth Circuit.29 The PGA Tour’s promise is especially
curious as it is estimated that the Ninth Circuit decision will be
handed down within eighteen months of the lower court decision.30
While the Martin case gives ADA plaintiffs some solid legal
ground for claims, the decision leaves much unanswered. Why did
the judge refuse to consider Martin’s claim that the PGA Tour is an
employer, which would have invoked Title I coverage? What type of
change would amount to an impermissible modification of various
professional sports rules? What type of consideration is a profes-
sional sports organization required to give to an individual player’s
disability?
Part II of this Note examines the history and purposes of the
ADA. Part III provides an overview of the Martin decision. Part IV
presents an alternative theory for determining Martin’s case: organi-
zations governing professional sports are employers and subject to
                                                                                                                      
23. See id. (referring to Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 808 F.2d 76
(D.C. Cir. 1987)). In Northwest Airlines, the court ordered the reinstatement specifically
because the FAA recertified the pilot to fly after he successfully completed alcohol rehabili-
tation. See Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 83. As the court stated in Gulf Coast Industrial
Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993), “A court would certainly be
hardpressed [sic] to oppose reinstatement where the regulatory body charged with ensur-
ing workplace safety agrees to [reinstatement].” Id. at 254.
24. Chavez, supra note 22, at 17.
25. Bob Ryan, Sorry, Free Rides Not Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1998, at E1.
26. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or. 1998).
27. See id. at 1251.
28. Nightline, supra note 18 (statement of Mike Von Freud, ABC News).
29. See Casey Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), appeal dock-
eted, Nos. 98-35309, -35509 (9th Cir. July 8, 1998); see also Gaye LeBaron, Gaye LeBaron’s
Notebook, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Apr. 1, 1998, at A2.
30. See Bob Robinson, Montgomerie Defends ‘Honesty,’ PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 1,
1998, at C4.
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Title I of the ADA. Finally, Part V concludes that the Martin decision
should be broadened and clarified.
II.   THE ADA: AN OVERVIEW
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 with only twenty-eight nay
votes in the House of Representatives31 and six nay votes in the Sen-
ate.32 Title I of the ADA covers the employment rights of disabled in-
dividuals.33 Congress intended it “to encourage employers to take on
qualified individuals, regardless of their disability.”34 Title II ad-
dresses discrimination in services provided by state and local gov-
ernments.35 Title III covers discrimination in public accommodations
and services offered by private entities.36 Title IV addresses retalia-
tion, coercion, state immunity, discrimination in telecommunications,
and other miscellaneous provisions.37
Before the enactment of the ADA, many viewed disabilities, espe-
cially mental or developmental disabilities, as a form of deviancy.38
Congress recognized that legislation was needed because individuals
with disabilities had been subjected to purposeful unequal treatment
and were politically powerless.39 Congress concluded that the dis-
abled: (1) are isolated and segregated; (2) are discriminated against
in employment, housing, public accommodations, education, trans-
portation, recreation, health, and public services; (3) have no legal
recourse; (4) continually encounter discrimination, including outright
exclusion, inflexible rules and policies, and lesser services in every
facet of living; and (5) are politically powerless and stereotyped.40
The ADA is a comprehensive statute. The Act covers the mentally
disabled,41 recovering drug addicts and alcoholics,42 and individuals
                                                                                                                      
31. See 136 CONG. REC. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
32. See 136 CONG. REC. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
33. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
34. Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1994).
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994).
36. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
37. See id. §§ 12201-12213.
38. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 101st CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (Comm. Print 1990).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994) (congressional findings).
40. See id. § 12101(a)(2)-(5), (7).
41. See id.  § 12102(2) (defining disability as a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee, who was no longer able to perform her former du-
ties because of a mental disorder, could bring an action against the employer alleging that
disparity in disability benefits violated the ADA).
42. See 42 U.S.C. 12114(a), (b) (1994) (providing coverage for recovering drug addicts
but not providing coverage to individuals currently using illegal drugs when the drug use
is the reason for the adverse action).
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with HIV.43 In the future, the ADA may assist many who are now
healthy because only fifteen percent of disabled Americans are born
with their respective disabilities.44
The ADA has made a significant impact on society in the context
of handicapped access because the disabled now have a right to ac-
cess offices, supermarkets, town halls, stadiums, theatres, and res-
taurants they could not physically enter before.45 In addition, the law
protects the disabled from hiring discrimination,46 although more
than two-thirds of the disabled remain unemployed.47
The Martin case was decided under Title III of the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability in the “full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation.”48 Discrimination includes the failure to make
reasonable modifications to policies when necessary to accommodate
the disabled.49 Discrimination also includes the imposition of eligi-
bility criteria that tend to screen out individuals with disabilities.50
To successfully litigate a claim under Title III, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving that she requested the public accommodation
to modify an existing policy, practice, or procedure to accommodate
her disability and that the requested modification is generally rea-
sonable for that type of public accommodation.51 This burden is met
by showing that the modification is reasonable in a general sense.52 If
special equipment is necessary for a reasonable modification, the
                                                                                                                      
43. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that the plaintiff’s
asymptomatic HIV infection was a “disability” under the ADA).
44. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECT OF REPRESENTATIONS MADE IN
APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PERSON IS A
“QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY” UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
IN AVOIDING WORKPLACE LITIGATION 141 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. H-562, 1997).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (defining public accommodation by a nonexclusive
list of places and services); see also Michael Grunwald, Casey Martin Ruling Should Be a
Milestone for All Disabled, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 15, 1998, at 3.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
47. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 7 (1989); 133 CONG. REC. H2410 (daily ed. May 17, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Hoyer).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
49. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
50. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
51. See Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1058-62 (5th Cir.
1997). The Fifth Circuit, for example, articulates the burden allocation as follows: the
plaintiff has the burden of proof on whether the proposed modification was requested and
reasonable. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to show that the modifi-
cation is unreasonable; the defendant must honor the request for modification unless it
meets its burden of proving that the requested modification would fundamentally alter the
nature of the public accommodation. See id.
52. See id. But see Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the reasonableness of a requested modification is a fact-specific inquiry).
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public accommodation must provide the equipment unless the modi-
fication would impose an undue burden, or would fundamentally al-
ter the nature of the public accommodation.53
III.   MARTIN V. PGA TOUR, INC.: A REVOLUTIONARY DECISION FOR
DISABLED PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES?
The Martin case dealt with many issues for the first time: almost
all previous ADA cases in the sports context involved disputes over
eligibility requirements, especially academic eligibility at the college
level.54
The arguments in Martin, however, first focused on whether the
PGA Tour is subject to the ADA.55 The PGA Tour presented three
theories that would exempt it from ADA coverage. The PGA Tour
first contended that the ADA was not designed or intended to apply
to competitors in professional golf tournaments.56 Next, the PGA
Tour argued that it is not a public accommodation, and that even if it
were considered a public accommodation, the PGA Tour is exempt
from the ADA’s requirements because it falls under the private or-
ganization exemption.57
                                                                                                                      
53. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1058-62. In Johnson, the plaintiff, who was blind, chal-
lenged the defendant brewery’s blanket no-animal policy on its brewery tours and success-
fully argued that the brewery’s failure to allow him to take his guide dog with him on a
tour violated the ADA’s Title III. The plaintiff met his burden of proving that the requested
modification of the brewery’s policy to permit access for his guide dog on the tour was rea-
sonable, and the defendant brewery failed to prove that the modification would fundamen-
tally alter the brewery’s tour. See id. at 1064. The court ordered the defendant to submit a
plan permitting broad access for dogs on the brewery tours, which would permit the court
to make further findings regarding the fundamental alterations resulting from these pro-
posed modifications. See id. at 1065.
54. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) dictates certain academic
requirements for its athletes. Some athletes have challenged these standards with mixed
results. For example, in Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 992 F. Supp. 1114
(E.D. Miss. 1998), the court ruled that the NCAA operates a place of public accommodation
for Title III purposes. See id. at 1121. However, the court denied a preliminary injunction
to a student who alleged the NCAA violated Title III when it refused to recognize a non-
standard, untimed American College Test score for purposes of determining the student’s
eligibility. See id. at 1123. In Butler v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C96-1656D,
1996 WL 1058233, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 1996), the court preliminarily enjoined the
NCAA from declaring a learning disabled student ineligible because he had not fulfilled his
core course requirements. Conversely, in Gander v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No.
96-C-6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996), the court held that the substi-
tution of core courses would require a fundamental alteration to the program. The court
also found that the student received the required individual consideration via the school’s
waiver process, which allows a school (but not a student) to seek waiver of core course re-
quirements in certain circumstances. See id. at *2-3.
55. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998); Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998) (denying the Tour’s summary judg-
ment motion).
56. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
57. See id. at 1323.
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Martin asserted that the PGA Tour is subject to the ADA for three
reasons. First, the Tour offers examinations or courses that are cov-
ered by the ADA.58 Second, the PGA Tour is a private entity that op-
erates a place of public accommodation, and third, the PGA Tour is
the golfers’ employer.59 Without discussion, the Martin court dis-
missed the characterization of the PGA Tour as a private entity that
offers covered examinations or courses as well as the assertion that
Martin is an employee of the PGA Tour.60
This Note will not discuss Martin’s first contention, that the PGA
Tour offers courses or examinations covered by the ADA.61 The issue
of whether Martin is one of the Tour’s employees is discussed in Part
IV of this Note. The following subsection addresses Martin’s second
assertion that the PGA Tour operates a public accommodation cov-
ered by the ADA.
A.   The Public Accommodation Determination: The First Step
Toward Coverage of a Private Entity Under the ADA
A private entity is subject to the antidiscrimination provisions of
Title III of the ADA if it “owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.”62 The owner, lessor, lessee, or opera-
tor of a place of public accommodation must not discriminate “on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, serv-
ices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”63
 “Golf course” is specifically listed as a public accommodation un-
der the ADA.64 Despite this fact, the PGA Tour presented a pub-
lic/private zone argument to distinguish itself from the Act’s enu-
meration. The PGA Tour argued that what occurs “inside the ropes,”
the fairways and greens of golf courses cordoned off during a tour-
nament, is private and therefore exempt from the ADA because the
                                                                                                                      
58. See id. Private entities that offer examinations or courses related to applications,
licensing, certifications, or credentialling for professional or trade purposes must offer
these services in a manner accessible to persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12189
(1994). Martin argued that the PGA Tour’s qualifying tournament is analogous to failing a
bar examination because a golfer “failing” the tournament is “effectively refused member-
ship in the profession of golf.” Amended Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 38, Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998) (No. CIV.
97-6309-TC) [hereinafter Amended Memo].
59. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322.
60. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (D. Or. 1998).
61. Essentially Martin argued that qualifying rounds were covered under Title II of
the ADA, as an examination of the golfer’s skills. The court dismissed this contention with-
out discussion. See id. Because the author believes it is more meritorious, she focuses on
the Title I coverage issue instead.
62. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (defining “public accommodation”).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
64. See id. § 12181(7)(L).
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general public is not allowed in this area.65 The court held the fact
that the general public is not allowed “inside the ropes” did not
transform a golf course into something other than a public accommo-
dation. The court reasoned that if no nonmembers are permitted on a
golf course’s grounds, a country club that did not qualify under the
private club exemption could still refuse to accommodate its handi-
capped members and thereby subvert the requirements of the ADA.66
In addition, the court reasoned that the inside/outside ropes distinc-
tion is unimportant because if this proposition were accepted, the op-
erator of a place of public accommodation could “relegate the ADA to
hopscotch areas” of its premises.67
The Martin court failed to cite an important case that furthers
this reasoning.68 In Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc.,69 a federal district
court held that an entire private golf course was subject to Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the golf course operated a public
lunch counter.70 The Laurel Links case vividly illustrates Martin’s
argument that entire golf courses are considered public accommoda-
tions, even when the PGA Tour is present. In addition, the Martin
court did not focus on another argument that could be useful in cases
similar to Martin’s: “the ropes” are not stationary. As the PGA Tour
moves from course to course, the area separated by the ropes changes
as the particular game progresses. This fact is compelling because
the PGA Tour cannot point to a permanent or even specific area that
is exempt from ADA coverage.
Although the court ultimately concluded that the PGA Tour is a
place of public accommodation, it erred in its elaboration of the pub-
lic/private zone issue. The court asserted that a disabled manager of
a professional baseball team has a right to a reasonable modification
even though the public is not allowed in the dugout.71 The problem
with this analogy is that the manager, clearly an employee of the
team, would be covered under Title I of the ADA, which mandates
greater protections for the disabled.72 The court, however, refused to
apply Title I to the PGA Tour’s professional golfers.73
                                                                                                                      
65. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (D. Or. 1998).
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1327. For a discussion of the private club exemption, see infra Part III.B.
68. The court instead used the case to discuss its finding that nonmembers used the
Tour’s “facilities.” See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 (citing Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261
F. Supp. 474 (E.D.Va.1966)).
69. 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966).
70. See id. at 476.
71. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327.
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
73. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that
“an employer does not include a bona fide private membership club”). The distinction be-
tween Titles I and III will be addressed infra Part IV.
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Although the sports manager analogy was flawed, the court suc-
cessfully illustrated its point through analogies to executive suites in
sports arenas and to private schools: although executive suites and
private schools are open only to specific invitees, they are still classi-
fied as places of public accommodation.74 Thus, the private charac-
teristics of the roped-off area are not determinative.
The court’s ruling that the PGA Tour is a place of public accom-
modation is controversial. One commentator argued that the Martin
court “does not consider the fairways and greens of golf courses to be
off-limits to the public during tournament play.”75 He asserted that
the court’s holding is in error because Congress never intended that
the ADA “require public access to the competitive area of a profes-
sional sporting event while the event is in progress.”76 However, the
commentator erred in his analysis because the general public does
not need access to an area at all times in order for it to be considered
a public accommodation.77
The crux of the commentator’s argument is that the court ignored
the well-established legal distinction between an entity’s private and
public areas.78 However, the court did no such thing. The question
the court addressed was not whether there can be a legal distinction
between different areas of a single facility or entity, but whether
there was a legal distinction in this context given the nature of the
so-called private area and the fact that the ADA specifically lists golf
courses as places of public accommodation.79
The area inside the ropes can be more accurately characterized as
quasi-public because it is open to individuals such as reporters, cer-
tain volunteers, and vendors. The competitive area cannot be com-
pared to a private apartment as one commentator attempted.80 Pri-
vate apartments are not included under ADA regulations, and fur-
ther, unlike private apartments, golf courses that host the PGA
Tour’s tournaments are open to the public a majority of the time. In
addition, the public is invited to attend and help fund the tourna-
                                                                                                                      
74. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327.
75. Scott Mills, Off-Course View of ADA Golf-Cart Decision Perverts Law’s Intent,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 1, 1998, at H1. Mr. Mills is an employment law attorney in Wash-
ington, D.C.
76. Id.; see also Mike Rosen, Martin’s Suit Against PGA Was Flawed, COLORADO
SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 20, 1998, at 7 (stating that the Tour should not be
treated “like a restaurant”). Rosen also mistakenly argued that Magistrate Judge Coffin
treated the Tour’s golfers as employees. See id.
77. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (explaining that the general public does not
have access to reception halls during a wedding or convention centers during a political
convention, yet these places are considered places of public accommodation.).
78. See Mills, supra note 75, at H1.
79. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (noting not only that the ADA lists golf
courses as public accommodations, but also that golf courses normally are open to the pub-
lic most of the time).
80. See Mills, supra note 75, at H1.
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ments. The Martin ruling does not place “landlords, tenants, prop-
erty managers and private employers at risk of lawsuits by unwel-
come and uninvited members of the public.”81 After determining that
the PGA Tour is a public accommodation, the court still had to decide
whether the PGA Tour is entitled to an exemption from the ADA on
the theory that it is a “private” organization.
B.   The Private Club Exemption: Designed to Protect Freedom of
Association Values
The ADA excludes certain private clubs and establishments from
coverage.82 Such exemptions are narrowly construed, and the burden
of proving an exemption rests on the organization claiming it.83 When
determining whether an organization qualifies for the private club
exemption, courts look at the following: (1) genuine selectivity in
membership; (2) membership control of the organization; (3) history
of the organization; (4) the extent the organization’s facilities are
utilized by nonmembers; (5) the organization’s purpose; (6) whether
the organization advertises for members; and (7) whether the organi-
zation is nonprofit.84
The PGA Tour argued that it was not covered under the ADA due
to the “lack” of public participation in its events, its nonprofit status,
and the selective process it uses when choosing new members.85 The
PGA Tour argued that because so few golfers can compete at its level,
it is genuinely selective.86 The court, however, held that the PGA
Tour’s eligibility requirements did not amount to “genuine selectiv-
ity” because the requirements were merely skill tests inherent in all
professional sports.87 In addition, the court did not find the PGA
Tour’s requirement that players submit a $3000 fee and two letters
of reference before entering a qualifying school tournament to be evi-
dence of genuine selectivity.88 The tests and requirements did not
qualify for private club exemption status because they were not de-
signed to screen out members based on freedom of association values
such as social, moral, philosophical, or religious beliefs, which were
the foundation for the private club exemption.89
                                                                                                                      
81. Id. (arguing that the Martin case exposes these individuals to risk).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994).
83. See Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1980)
(decided under Title VII); Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968) (same).
84. See Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-25.
85. The Tour includes approximately 470 players at any given time. See id. at 1321.
86. See id. at 1324-25.
87. See id. at 1325.
88. See id. at 1322.
89. See id. at 1325.
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The PGA Tour also argued that the lack of public participation in
PGA Tour events evidenced its status as a private club.90 However,
the court focused on the pervasive presence of the public (the specta-
tors) at PGA Tour events and the numerous nonplayers who partici-
pate in the operation of the event, such as reporters and caddies.91
The court also noted the importance of the public in generating reve-
nue for the PGA Tour, finding the Tour’s success directly dependent
on public participation, which militates against a determination of
private club status.92
Finally, the court found it compelling that the organization’s pri-
mary purpose is to generate revenue and specifically found that the
PGA Tour is a commercial entity.93 This commercial status weighed
against the importance of its nonprofit status.94 The court stated that
an association whose primary purpose is to generate revenue is not
the type of organization Congress intended to protect with the pri-
vate club exemption.95
The ruling that the PGA Tour does not qualify for the private club
exemption is important because Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 contains a similar exemption.96 Accordingly, if the court ruled
for the PGA Tour on this issue, not only would the PGA Tour be ex-
cluded from ADA coverage, it would also be exempted from the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Therefore, a ruling that the PGA Tour is a pri-
vate club would allow the PGA Tour to discriminate on the grounds
of race, color, religion, or national origin, unless the discrimination
was prohibited by another statute.
The court failed to accept any of the PGA Tour’s three claims of
exemption from the ADA’s requirements and turned its analysis to
whether Martin’s requested accommodation was reasonable, would
pose an undue burden,97 or would fundamentally alter the nature of
the game of golf.98
C.   The Reasonableness of the Requested Accommodation
An ADA plaintiff requesting a modification has the burden to
prove that the requested modification is generally reasonable for that
                                                                                                                      
90. See id. at 1322-24.
91. See id. at 1327.
92. See id. at 1323.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1325.
95. See id. The purpose of the private club exemption is to preserve the right of “truly
private” organizations, such as those that share “elementary beliefs,” to maintain their
“unique existence.” Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1993).
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) (prohibiting the discrimination of individuals on the
grounds of their race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation).
97. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (D. Or. 1998).
98. See id. at 1249.
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type of public accommodation.99 The court in Martin found that Mar-
tin’s requested modification to use a golf cart during competition was
reasonable.100
The court based its reasonableness determination on a number of
factors. The PGA has carts available at each event and uses them pe-
riodically. Moreover, the PGA Tour allows carts to be used during the
first two stages of its qualifying tournaments and all stages of the
Senior Tour, yet does not impose a handicap system or stroke penalty
on those who opt for carts during these events.101 In addition, the
court found Martin’s requested modification reasonable in light of the
fact that the NCAA and some college conferences, all of which follow
virtually the same rules as the PGA Tour,102 grant exemptions from
the “must walk” regulation.103 These factors led the court to deter-
mine Martin’s requested modification was reasonable.
D.   The Public Accommodation’s Affirmative Defense: Fundamental
Alteration
Title III provides a fundamental alteration defense to an other-
wise reasonable modification. A requested modification is not re-
quired if the defendant can demonstrate “that making such modifica-
tions would fundamentally alter the nature of [the] goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”104 For exam-
ple, hitting a ball well and running bases is fundamental to major
league baseball. Therefore, if a baseball league were forced to modify
the game to accommodate players who could not run, the sport would
be fundamentally altered.
The place of public accommodation has the burden to prove that
the requested modification would fundamentally alter its nature.105 If
the covered entity can prove that the requested modification would
provide an unfair advantage to a disabled individual, then proof of
fundamental alteration is satisfied.106 Unlike the reasonableness in-
quiry, the fundamental alteration inquiry is specific to the individual
plaintiff’s circumstances.107
                                                                                                                      
99. See id. (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059
(5th Cir. 1997)); see also discussion supra note 51.
100. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248.
101. See id.
102. See Richard Sandomir, Golf: Witness in Martin Case Calls Golf a Low-Energy Ac-
tivity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at C4.
103. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
105. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel
Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1058-62 (5th Cir. 1997)); see also discussion supra note 51.
106. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1058.
107. See id.
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Martin argued that walking is only incidental to professional
golf.108 The PGA Tour’s no-cart rule is not contained in the industry’s
rulebook;109 the PGA Tour invokes Local Rule 33-1110 to bar carts.111
Further, cart usage is permitted to shuttle players from the ninth to
the tenth green during regular events. When a player hits a tee shot
out of bounds, the player can use a cart to return from the fairway to
the tee to hit another shot.112 In addition, the PGA rulebook defines a
caddie, like a cart, as an additional piece of equipment, although
caddie use is mandatory.113 The PGA Tour argued that the use of
carts in other venues is not relevant to the PGA and Nike Tours.114
According to the PGA Tour, providing a cart to Martin would give
him an unfair advantage, fundamentally altering the sport.115
A covered entity can utilize the fundamental alteration defense if
the requested accommodation provides an unfair advantage to the
disabled individual.116 Accordingly, the PGA Tour argued that the
walking rule is necessary to introduce an element of fatigue into the
game.117 The PGA Tour attempted to stress the correlation between
walking and fatigue in golf by pointing out that Ken Venturi won the
1964 U.S. Open despite almost losing consciousness.118 However, Dr.
Gary Klug, a physiologist specializing in fatigue, testified that Ven-
turi’s condition was caused by heat exhaustion and fluid loss instead
of walking.119 The court accepted this explanation, noting that the
spectators at the tournament were passing out as well.120
                                                                                                                      
108. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249 (noting that “[n]o written policy has been cited
by either party which governs the Rules Committee in its exercise of discretion regarding a
waiver of the walking requirement”).
109. See id. at 1252.
110. A local rule varies the United States Golf Association Rules of Golf to accommo-
date certain physical characteristics of individual golf courses and/or environmental condi-
tions during play. Golf committees or course owner-initiated local rules can cover one event
or all play for a certain period of time.
111. The PGA Tour promulgates a pamphlet entitled Conditions of Competition and
Local Rules that governs PGA Tour and Nike Tour tournaments. The preamble to this
document states that “[t]he Rules of the United States Golf Association govern play, as
modified by the PGA Tour.” One of those modifications provides that “[p]layers shall walk
at all times during a stipulated round unless permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules
Committee.” Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249 (quoting PGA Tour, Inc., Conditions of Competi-
tion and Local Rules, at app.I, ¶ 6 (Transportation)); see also Bob Burns, Tour in No-Win
Situation Issue, Pros Say, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 29, 1998, at E3.
112. See Kelley, supra note 7, at D1.
113. See Eric F. Epler, Martin Deserves Chance to Compete, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Feb.
2, 1998, at C3.
114. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248-49 (noting that the PGA Tour has never granted
a waiver of its walking requirement for individualized circumstances).
115. See id. at 1249-51.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b)(2)(A) (1994).
117. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 1250-51. Notably, the United States Golf Association (USGA) prohibits
the use of carts with roofs; Martin is exposed to the sun and humidity, even in a cart. See
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Dr. Klug also testified that walking casually for eighteen holes is
not very tiring and that no other sport is as low in energy consump-
tion as golf.121 Klug also testified that golfers have numerous inter-
vals of rest when competing.122 Unlike athletes playing more “physi-
cal” sports such as basketball and baseball, golf is a sport that does
not require a great deal of aerobic activity.123 The Pacific Athletic
Conference (PAC) 10 and NCAA both deemphasize the importance of
walking: both give qualified disabled players a cart124 even though
both organizations govern more physically and mentally demanding
tournaments.125 Martin’s position is that the fatigue suffered by golf-
ers is caused by the intense concentration involved in hitting a golf
ball around a course for five hours while under pressure.126
Regardless of whether carts generally give disabled golfers an un-
fair advantage, a defendant can only satisfy its burden of proving
fundamental alteration by presenting evidence that “focuses on the
specifics of the plaintiff’s or defendant’s circumstances and not on the
general nature of the accommodation.”127 General evidence is only
relevant to the plaintiff’s burden of proving the reasonableness of the
requested modification.128
The Martin court concluded that Martin works at least as hard
with a cart during a round as most players walking the full eighteen
holes.129 Many golfers believe that any golfer is at a disadvantage
using a cart because the golfer does not get a “feel” for the course by
walking it.130 Carts were an option given to the nearly 300 golfers in
a PGA Tour qualifying tournament. Martin was one of fewer than a
dozen golfers who chose to use the cart.131 Lastly, Martin has another
                                                                                                                      
Barker Davis, Casey at Bat Martin’s Guts Merit Him a Chance to Ride, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
2, 1998, at B1.
121. See Sandomir, supra note 102, at C4. Dr. Klug further stated that the average
round of golf consumes only 500 calories, which is “nutritionally less than a Big Mac.” Mar-
tin, 994 F. Supp at 1250.
122. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1250.
123. See Joe Queenan, Differently-Abled Athletes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1998, at A18.
124. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248.
125. See Bob Robinson, Martin Ready to Step up His Fight, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Feb. 2, 1998, at D1 (noting that players in these competitions are required to carry their
bags personally and compete in 36-hole days).
126. See Nightline, supra note 18 (statement of Mike Stachura, Reporter, GOLF
DIGEST).
127. Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248-49 (quoting Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl
Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1997), and citing Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d
1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that that the determination is “highly fact-specific”);
Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 872 F. Supp. 682, 687 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(emphasizing individualized assessment)).
128. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1060.
129. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251.
130. See id.
131. See (Golf) Martin Can Use Cart After Landmark Decision by Judge, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2220339.
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disadvantage: because even practice is painful, Martin cannot waste
what little physical energy he has on the practice range.132
The court decided that granting Martin an exemption from the no-
cart rule would not fundamentally alter the nature of the competi-
tions Martin competes in by giving him an unfair advantage and held
that the PGA Tour must permit Martin to use a cart.133 Although the
Martin court decided his case under Title III of the ADA, the courts
have another option that will better serve the interests of disabled
professional athletes—deciding these disputes under Title I of the
ADA.
IV.   TITLE I OF THE ADA: A COMPELLING ALTERNATIVE
So far, courts have found that ADA disputes concerning sports fall
under Title III. The Martin court refused to consider Martin’s case
under Title I, which addresses employment.134 Title I prohibits dis-
crimination of a “qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.”135
The most significant drawback to Title III suits is the lack of
available remedies. Compensatory and punitive damages are avail-
able to private plaintiffs only under Title I.136 Title III only provides
successful plaintiffs with injunctive relief and reasonable attorney’s
fees.137 Perhaps most importantly, only Title I provides the right to a
jury trial,138 which is generally favored by plaintiffs’ attorneys in civil
rights cases.
Under Title I, an employee or applicant must be “qualified” in or-
der to seek the Act’s protection. The employee or applicant must be
                                                                                                                      
132. See Davis, supra note 120, at B1.
133. See Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1252-54.
134. See id. at 1247.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
136. See id. § 1981a(a)(2). However, compensatory damages and civil penalties may be
sought in actions brought by the Attorney General under Title III. See id. § 12188(b)(2)(B).
Title III civil penalties are not the equivalent of Title I punitive damages.  Under Title III,
a civil penalty shall not exceed $50,000 for the first violation and $100,000 for each subse-
quent violation. See id. § 12188(b)(2)(B). The sum of compensatory and punitive damages
under Title I is capped between $50,000 to $300,000 depending on the number of individu-
als the defendant employs. See id. § 1981a(b)(3). Punitive damages are available in Title I
suits where the defendant discriminated with malice or reckless indifference to certain
federally protected rights. See id. § 1981a(b)(1).
137. See id. § 12188(a)(1) (stating that remedies are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-
3(a)); see also Newman v. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) (holding that plaintiffs
bringing suit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enjoin racial discrimination
by public accommodations are not entitled to money damages but may recover attorney’s
fees).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994).
1999]                         CASEY’S CASE 799
capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or with-
out reasonable accommodation before an employer will be in viola-
tion of the Act for not providing a requested reasonable accommoda-
tion.139 A reasonable accommodation could include the provision of
equipment or devices to enable a disabled individual to perform a job
provided that the accommodation does not impose an undue hardship
on the employer.140 The ADA provides four factors for determining
whether the provision of an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the employer: (1) the nature and cost to the employer; (2)
the overall financial resources of the employer; (3) the overall re-
sources of the employer; and (4) the employer’s type of operation.141
In contrast, Title III does not provide an undue hardship defense.
The closest thing to Title I’s undue hardship defense is the previously
discussed fundamental alteration defense.142 The fundamental al-
teration defense requires a fact-specific inquiry that is directed to the
nature of the public accommodation, not the hardship imposed by the
cost of the modification.143 The difference between these defenses can
be important: Title I’s undue hardship defense is more narrowly de-
fined than Title III’s fundamental alteration defense, even though
fundamental alteration is merely a particular type of undue hard-
ship.144
A.   Professional Sports Associations as Employers
Some nontraditional employers, such as unions, are covered under
the ADA.145 The determination of whether an entity qualifies as an
employer and an individual as an employee depends on the nature of
the relationship. The ADA defines an employee as “an individual
employed by an employer.”146 The definitions of employer and em-
ployee under the ADA are identical to those in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964;147 therefore, Title VII cases can be illustrative
                                                                                                                      
139. See id. § 12111(8).
140. See id. § 12111(9).
141. See id. § 12111(10)(B). The regulations list a fifth factor. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)
(1998) (“The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the
impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the fa-
cility’s ability to conduct business.”).
142. Title III has an undue burden defense for a covered entity’s failure to provide
auxiliary aids and services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1994).
143. See Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1064-65 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that the modification of the brewery’s blanket no-animal policy to permit
access for guide dogs would not fundamentally alter the nature of the tour).
144. See id. at 1059.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994); see also Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94
F.3d 1041, 1046 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996). The ADA defines “covered entity” as “an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(2) (1994).
146. Id. § 12111(4).
147. See id. § 2000e(b), (f).
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when interpreting an employer’s or employee’s status under the
ADA.
B.   Professional Athletes as Employees
The ADA protects an employee who is a “qualified individual with
a disability.”148 This is defined as a person with the requisite skill,
experience, and other job related requirements of the position and
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of the job.149 Because Martin is clearly qualified to
play professional golf with a reasonable accommodation and is dis-
abled, he meets this definition, unless he is considered an independ-
ent contractor.
Courts use three similar tests: the common law or Darden test,150
the “economic realities” test,151 and a hybrid of these tests to deter-
mine whether an individual is an independent contractor or an em-
ployee. The common law test focuses on the right to control the man-
ner and means by which the work is accomplished. The economic re-
alities test examines the relationship between the worker and em-
ployer as well as the economics of the parties. Meanwhile, the hybrid
test combines the right to control factor with a consideration of the
economic realities between the parties.152
                                                                                                                      
148. Id. § 12112.
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1998).
150. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). The Darden Court
stated:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general
common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the man-
ner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors
relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentali-
ties and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects
to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and pay-
ing assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee bene-
fits; and the tax treatment  of the hired party.
Id. at 323-24 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989) (footnotes omitted)).
151. See EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983). The economic realities
test is more liberal than the common law test. Courts utilizing the economic realities test
weigh the following factors: (1) the extent of the employer's control and supervision over
the worker, including directions on scheduling and performance of work, (2) the kind of oc-
cupation and the nature of skill required, including whether skills are obtained in the
workplace, (3) the responsibility for the costs of operation, such as equipment, supplies,
fees, licenses, workplace, and the maintenance of operations, (4) the method and form of
payment and benefits, and (5) the length of job commitment and/or expectations. See id.
152. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The hybrid tests
generally emphasize the right to control and the economic realities of the relationship. See
Wolcott v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1989). The prominence of
the right to control distinguishes the hybrid tests from the pure economic realities test. See
id.
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In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,153 the Court ad-
mitted that the statutory definition of “employee” under the Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)154 is “circular and
explains nothing.”155 The Court stated that when a statute does not
define “employee” usefully, courts should not apply a meaning
broader than the common law definition.156 Prior to Darden, some
courts thoroughly considered legislative intent when defining the
term “employee.”157 Thus, the Darden Court basically refused to ap-
ply the traditional statutory construction rules that the definitional
scope of “employee” should be construed based on the legislative in-
tent of the statute at issue.158
The Darden Court narrowed the purview of the term “employee,”
at least under ERISA. Although the definition of “employee” is iden-
tical in ERISA, Title VII, and the ADA, there is a split in the circuits
as to whether the Darden test applies to employment cases other
than ERISA disputes.159
Courts currently consider many different factors when determin-
ing whether an individual is an employee. Unless there is no ques-
tion as to the individual’s status, the determination is for the fact
finder because the definition of “employee” turns on the facts of the
case.160  A question of fact exists if some factors weigh in favor of in-
dependent contractor status and other factors weigh in favor of em-
ployee status.161 Some of these enumerated factors clearly point to a
finding that professional golfers are independent contractors; others
point to a finding that professional golfers are employees. The fol-
lowing is an analysis of the Martin case, using the common law fac-
                                                                                                                      
153. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
154. Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1371 (1994).
155. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 322-24.
158. See id. at 326; see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Magnificent Circularity and the
Churkendoose: LLC Members and Federal Employment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
477, 544 (1997) (arguing that the Darden Court’s analysis violates the traditional rules of
statutory construction because the Court effectively foreclosed the inquiry into legislative
intent).
159. See, e.g., Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding that a teaching assistant was not an employee of a prison academy by ap-
plying a “hybrid test,” noting that the person was paid and received benefits from the
school board rather than the prison); Wolcott v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 245,
251 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff insurance agent was not an employee under
the common law test because he hired his own employees, maintained his own office, exer-
cised managerial skill in operation of the business, and was paid on a commission basis).
160. See EEOC v. Pettegrove Truck Serv., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1430, 1433 (S.D. Fla.
1989).   
161. See Stouch v. Brothers of the Order of Hermits, 836 F. Supp. 1134, 1141-42 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
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tors originally articulated in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid.162
First, courts consider the skill required in performing an occupa-
tion.163 Some courts look to whether the skills the employer seeks are
commonly found in its workforce; even highly skilled persons can be
considered employees where the skill sought by the employer is not
unique in its workforce.164 Although professional golfers are highly
skilled professionals, they are the foundation of the PGA Tour’s
workforce. This factor points to employee status.
Second, courts consider the time and location where work is per-
formed.165 The PGA Tour owns and operates many of the golf courses
used in the tournaments166 and singly decides where tournaments
are to be played. Further, although the players can technically decide
which tournaments in which to play, the PGA Tour puts substantial
pressure on the players to compete in every event.167 Benefits such as
voting, retirement plans, and future eligibility are tied to the number
of tournaments played.168 This factor weighs in favor of employee
status.
Third, courts examine the duration of the employer-employee re-
lationship.169 In Martin, the PGA Tour focused on the fact that Mar-
tin was with the Tour for only a few months when he filed suit.170
Martin pointed out that golfers retain the status of regular members
for at least a year once they achieve it171 and can maintain their
regular status through medical extensions,172 much like an employee
being granted a leave of absence, which extends the duration of the
relationship. Arguably, this factor also tends to show employee
status.
Fourth, courts look to the employer’s role in the hiring and the
payment of the employee’s assistants.173 Although professional golf-
ers pay and hire their own caddies, the PGA Tour must approve
them. The PGA Tour itself hires assistants that provide travel, me-
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dia, accounting, and investment assistance to the players.174 This fac-
tor seems to weigh in favor of employee status.
Fifth, courts examine the employer’s right to assign additional du-
ties to the hired party.175 Although the PGA Tour cannot force play-
ers to perform tasks outside of playing golf, PGA Tour players are
strongly “encouraged” to play in Pro-Ams and other Tournament
Week events after signing up for a tournament.176 In fact, they can be
penalized for noncompliance.177 Again, an employee status is shown.
Sixth, courts examine the method of payment for the hired party’s
services.178 This factor cannot be solely determinative of an individ-
ual’s status. Individuals paid only by commission, for example, can
still be considered employees.179 PGA Tour players are issued 1099
tax forms,180 weighing in favor of a finding of independent contractor
status. However, nearly half of the average player’s earnings are the
guaranteed Pro-Am payments that are awarded regardless of per-
formance,181 again weighing in favor of employee status.
Seventh, courts consider the availability of employee-like bene-
fits.182 Although the golfers generally pay their own expenses and
sign individual contracts with equipment manufacturers,183 the spon-
sors provide the golfers with employee-like privileges such as food,
beverages, and lockers during tournaments.184 In addition, regular
Tour members qualify for retirement and health plans, as well as de-
ferred income packages.185 This factor tends toward employee status.
Eighth, courts consider the source of the instrumentalities.186 Al-
though the PGA Tour does not provide the instrumentalities used by
the players, its rules strictly prohibit the use of more than one ball
during play187 and prohibit certain equipment. In Gilder v. PGA Tour,
Inc.,188 players using U-shaped grooved golf clubs successfully sued
the Tour for banning the clubs after specifically permitting their use
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the previous five years.189 Although the players won this case, the
PGA Tour retains the right to ban instrumentalities it does not ap-
prove of, even if the instrumentalities comply with USGA rules.190
This degree of control over the instrumentalities weighs in favor of
PGA Tour golfers being employees.
Finally, two other factors weigh in favor of the golfers being con-
sidered employees of the PGA Tour: the Tour is a business and the
“work” done by the “employees” is part of the regular business of the
Tour.191
Numerous other factors weigh in favor of the golfers being consid-
ered independent contractors. PGA Tour players do not have a su-
pervisor to report to on a regular basis. They are not required to
submit routine reports or accountings. They do not receive perform-
ance reviews. PGA Tour players generally consider themselves to be
independent contractors. They can play on other professional tours
(except during Tournament Week), and the PGA Tour does not pay
unemployment or worker’s compensation premiums for the players.
Weighing these factors side by side, it is possible that professional
athletes such as Martin are independent contractors. However, the
majority of courts hold an employer’s right of control is the most sig-
nificant indication of whether an individual is designated an em-
ployee or an independent contractor.192 In fact, one court stated that
factors other than the employer’s right of control are merely “secon-
dary elements” in the determination.193 Therefore, the actual circum-
stances of the relationship must be closely examined when evaluat-
ing the control factor.
C.   The Primary Factor: Control
In professional golf’s PGA and Nike Tours, the PGA Tour alone
decides who can compete, the time and place of the event, the play-
ers’ potential earnings (prize money), and the rules governing the
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conduct of the game.194 The terms and conditions of employment and
the “hiring” decisions are made by the PGA Tour, just like a tradi-
tional employer.195 In addition, the PGA Tour limits the field of play-
ers and subjects them to rules and standards, also similar to an em-
ployer.196 The PGA Tour owns the television rights of every partici-
pant in every tournament.197 The PGA Tour controls what players
wear and other aspects of how they appear in tournaments.198 It tells
the players how to conduct themselves, banning playing cards at the
tournament site,199 prohibiting the players from signing autographs
during play, and barring them from making negative comments re-
garding everything from the PGA Tour itself, to sponsors, and even
to other players.200 All of these considerations tend to show an em-
ployer-employee relationship between the PGA Tour and its golfers.
Unlike most entities that employ independent contractors, the
PGA Tour promulgates rules regarding the work itself by regulating
the actual playing of the game. Not only does the PGA Tour give the
players a deadline in which to complete their work, it requires the
players to maintain a certain pace. In addition, the PGA Tour has
rules regarding players’ interactions with their caddies and the play-
ers’ practice sessions.201
Notably, the PGA Tour strictly controls certain actions of the
players even when they are “off the clock.”202 The players cannot
write bad checks, use profanity, display anger, or even associate with
certain people.203 Because the PGA Tour asserts a significant degree
of control over its players, this fact alone could justify a determina-
tion that the golfers are employees. Taking the high degree of the
PGA Tour’s control over its players into account, it is at least argu-
able that an employer-employee relationship exists under either the
economic realities or Darden test. The integral question, however, is
whether the tests should even be applicable to employment discrimi-
nation actions.
D.   Congressional Intent: Broad Protection Against Employment
Discrimination
The Sixth Circuit has argued for complete rejection of the eco-
nomic realities test, favoring the extension of “coverage to all those
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who are in a position to suffer the harm [Title VII was] designed to
prevent.”204 While this premise was merely dicta, its reasoning is
sound. The court’s view is that antidiscrimination statutes should be
read in the light of “the mischief to be corrected and the end to be at-
tained” urging, “coverage to all those who are in a position to suffer
the harm the statute is designed to prevent, unless specifically ex-
cluded.”205 The Supreme Court has commanded courts to take notice,
as their “primary consideration,” whether the inclusion of the dis-
puted category of persons would effectuate the “declared policy and
purposes” of the statute.206 This principle is clearly applicable to pro-
fessional athletes and the ADA because Titles I and III are designed
to shield protected classes from interference with employment and
the enjoyment of public accommodations respectively, and neither
statute specifically excludes professional athletes from coverage.
Congress chose to leave it up to the courts to determine who qualifies
as an employee. If the courts truly want to further Congress’s intent
of prohibiting employers from frustrating the employment rights of
individuals with disabilities, they will construe the term “employee”
liberally.
Denying an athlete the right to participate in a sport is analogous
to denying a person the right to work in a chosen field because a pro-
fessional athlete’s method of making a living is playing the sport.
The important link between the athlete and her livelihood is a sports
governing organization, such as the PGA Tour. Although golfers and
other athletes can receive great economic rewards from sources other
than the professional association itself, many of these benefits flow
directly from membership in the association and participation in the
events it stages.207
Moreover, the PGA Tour has the ability to lock an individual out
of his or her profession completely: an individual cannot be consid-
ered a first class golfer if she is not a member of the PGA.208 Member-
ship in the sport’s governing association, such as the PGA, is re-
quired in order to participate in premier tournaments.209 Therefore,
in order to compete, the athlete has to accept an adhesion contract.210
Thus, the denial of accommodations to athletes with a disability, as
defined by the ADA, prevents these individuals from having a choice
to adhere to these adhesion contracts and forecloses their ability to
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work in their chosen profession. Clearly, Congress intended to pre-
vent persons from being excluded from their chosen sporting profes-
sion. If a person proves she is an otherwise qualified, disabled indi-
vidual, that person should be reasonably accommodated, just like in
a traditional employment situation.
V.   CONCLUSION
Is the PGA Tour simply exercising its right to make its own rules,
or is it using the rules to discriminate against persons with disabili-
ties? Should courts be kicked off the “field?” The controversy will con-
tinue to rage, but few fear a flood of lawsuits against professional
sports governing associations because of the Martin decision. Unlike
the Martin case, most of the nation’s 15,000 annual ADA cases con-
cern whether the plaintiff meets the ADA’s definition of a disabled
individual.211
Golfers who criticize the Martin decision do not fear a deluge of
professional golfers with permanent debilitating disabilities flooding
the offices of the PGA Tour’s policy board offices; someone with such
a serious disorder that can also play tournament level golf is one in a
million.212 Rather, the critics fear an onslaught of special requests
from golfers with bad backs, knees, and the like.213 They cite the lo-
gistical difficulty of trying to accommodate players with these unique
needs and the administrative burden of making determinations as to
which golfers qualify as disabled.214
Other critics cite the importance of tradition; a powerful concept
in the game of golf. The PGA and its PGA Tour have never been pro-
gressive. As late as 1961, the PGA Tour’s bylaws included a Cauca-
sian-only clause.215 Women have only been allowed in the upper level
of the PGA clubhouse for five years.216 However, rules and traditions
that create barriers for people with disabilities are rules and tradi-
tions that must be changed.
Outside the golfing community, critics have used the Martin deci-
sion to attack the ADA itself. Some simply believe the ADA is a
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safety net, which has been stretched beyond recognition.217 These
critics cite the cases of an anesthesiologist who claimed to have sleep
apnea, a 410-pound subway conductor who sued for larger cabs, a
GTE employee who said he carried guns illegally because of a nerv-
ous condition, and a bank required to install Braille on the driver’s
side of its drive-through ATMs.218 However, isolated cases that sim-
ply do not seem fair can be found in all areas of the law, not just in
ADA litigation. It is a safe assumption that the vast majority of
clearly unreasonable cases fail. Further, the ADA is not unreason-
able; the ADA does not require changes in the fundamental aspects
of a program, service, or sport. Accommodations are provided only to
those who otherwise qualify, and accommodations are not required if
they impose undue financial or administrative burdens.
The Martin case may have a significant impact on other types of
disability suits because the case stands for the proposition that the
disabled should participate fully in the game of life and should not be
held back by their disability. Martin’s disability should not hold him
back. The talent in golf is hitting a golf ball with precision and dis-
tance and keeping your cool as millions watch your performance.219
The essential aspect of the game is “hitting the ball in the fewest
number of stokes it takes to get it in a hole.”220 Martin can complete
these tasks very well. He just needs a ride to the starting line. The
cart is necessary for Martin to work. Sometimes, different treatment
is necessary to ensure true equality for individuals with disabilities.
Without a liberal interpretation of the ADA, persons with disabilities
will continue to be locked out of jobs and careers, clearly contrary to
congressional intent.
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